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Security & Privacy

File Encryption (Password-Protect Any File)

Encrypt any file with a password before sharing or storing it — AES-256-GCM in your browser. Decrypt it here later to get the original file back, name and all.

How to use

  1. 1Choose a file and enter a strong password, then press Encrypt to download a .enc file.
  2. 2To open it, drop the .enc file here, enter the password and press Decrypt.

How it's calculated

Same as text encryption: PBKDF2-SHA-256 (600,000 iterations) → AES-256-GCM. The original filename is stored inside the encrypted data.

Frequently asked questions

Are my files uploaded?

No — everything happens locally in your browser. Nothing leaves your device.

How large a file can I encrypt?

Files up to a few hundred MB work in most browsers; very large files depend on your device's memory.

Can other tools open the .enc file?

It's a documented AES-GCM format but meant to be decrypted with this tool. For long-term archives, also consider 7-Zip with AES-256.

What's inside the .enc file

The output isn't just ciphertext — it's a small documented container: a 4-byte magic marker ("TSE1"), a 16-byte random salt, a 12-byte random IV (initialization vector), and then the AES-256-GCM-encrypted payload, which itself starts with your original filename (length-prefixed) followed by the file's bytes. That's why decrypting hands back the exact original filename rather than making you rename it — the name travels inside the encrypted data, not as separate metadata an attacker (or a cloud storage provider) could read.

Why a fresh salt and IV every time

The salt feeds into PBKDF2 (600,000 iterations of SHA-256) to turn your password into the actual AES key — a new random salt each time means the same password produces a completely different key on every encryption, so two files encrypted with the same password don't reveal that fact to anyone inspecting them. The IV serves AES-GCM specifically: reusing an IV with the same key is a real cryptographic weakness that can leak information about the plaintext, so a fresh random 12-byte IV is generated per file. Both are stored unencrypted at the front of the file, which is safe — they're not secret, they're inputs the decryption side needs.

What a wrong password actually tells you

AES-GCM is an authenticated cipher: decryption doesn't silently produce garbled output on a wrong password, it fails outright, because the GCM authentication tag fails to verify against data decrypted with the wrong key. That's a useful property — you always get an honest "wrong password, or the data was changed" message rather than a corrupted file you'd mistake for a working one. It also means if a byte of the .enc file gets corrupted in transit, decryption will fail rather than quietly handing you a damaged version of your original file.

The password is the only thing protecting the file

There's no password recovery, no backdoor, and no master key — PBKDF2's 600,000 iterations are specifically chosen (OWASP's current recommendation) to make brute-forcing a weak password slow even with GPU hardware, but a short or common password is still crackable given enough attempts. Treat the password for a file you're encrypting the same way you'd treat a password you're trusting to protect the actual content — long and random, not something you'd also use to log into a website. And since everything runs through WebCrypto locally in your browser, no file or password is ever transmitted anywhere during either direction.

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